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    170 Years Ago in Seneca Falls New York, Voting Was a Radical Idea
    Kathryn Sikkink. 7/31/2018. “170 Years Ago in Seneca Falls New York, Voting Was a Radical Idea.” Medium. See full text.Abstract

    Original publication via Harvard's Ash Center.

    On July 19th, we celebrated the 170th anniversary of the Seneca Falls Convention, a gathering that launched a global movement to secure the right to vote for women. As people in the US and around the world lament the state of our democracy, now is a good time to reflect on an anniversary that reminds us of how democratic change occurs.

    Women’s suffrage was the most radical demand that Elizabeth Cady Stanton included in the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments in 1848. When Stanton first suggested a suffrage resolution at the Seneca Falls Convention, even her most resolute supporters were afraid that it might make the women’s movement look ridiculous and compromise their other goals. Voting was considered the quintessential male domain of action. Resolutions on other issues at Seneca Falls, such as equal access to jobs and education for women, passed unanimously, while the suffrage resolution carried by a small majority and only after eloquent speeches by Stanton and abolitionist Frederick Douglass. It would take decades of struggle, including parades, protests, arrests, hunger strikes, and force feeding, before the US acknowledged women’s right to vote in 1920. The struggle to secure the vote for African Americans is an even longer story that can be traced from the Civil War to current voter suppression in states like North Carolina.

    Our appreciation of voting as a radical demand secured through decades of struggle has been lost in US politics today, as reflected in low voter registration and turnout. At Harvard, where I teach, 59% of eligible students voted in the 2016 presidential election and only 24% in the 2014 midterm elections. This spring, I did a small set of focus groups with Harvard undergraduates to gauge their attitudes toward voting in an attempt to understand these low numbers. In every group, at least one person clearly articulated the belief that voting is a privilege and duty of citizenship. A small number argued that there was no duty whatsoever to vote and that there might be good reasons not to vote. Most students, however, fell in between these two positions. They argued that voting is the right thing to do, but that it is optional and that there are many reasons why it is acceptable not to vote. These reasons include lack of compelling candidates, lack of information, lack of interest, and lack of a personal stake in the matter.

    “All of us have to collaborate in helping people exercise their legal right and their civic duty to vote”

    These students revealed disillusionment with the political system, saying their vote would not make a difference. Voting was one option for participation in a democratic society, but for many of the students it held little meaning or impact. The passion of Seneca Falls was missing. One student mused, “I wish that there was a way … to make people more enthusiastic about voting. … apathy is a huge problem…”

    People often assume college students don’t need advice or help to vote, especially Ivy League students. But many of the students found the US voting system genuinely complicated, and antiquated, especially in the case of absentee voting. At times, what the students described reached the level of voter suppression.

    We need to continue the struggles launched by the activists in Seneca Falls to expand voting. If some of the smartest and most motivated young people in America today find voting difficult, we have a responsibility to help them and many others as they navigate the often complicated and sometimes hostile terrain of the US voting system. Voter suppression has been a conscious and well-orchestrated set of policies in many states; voter encouragement must be no less conscious or collective. Ensuring that US citizens enjoy the right to vote is very much the work of our government and political parties, but should not be left only to them. All of us have to collaborate in helping people exercise their legal right and their civic duty to vote.

    Kathryn Sikkink is the Ryan Family Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Carol K. Pforzheimer Professor at Radcliffe

    After 17 Years, Justice For 9/11 Remains Elusive
    Sushma Raman. 9/27/2018. “After 17 Years, Justice For 9/11 Remains Elusive.” Human Rights First. See full text.Abstract
    Sushma Raman discusses the government’s twin challenges—upholding both the rule of law and national security—and the resulting delays in the trails of the 9/11 suspects.
     

    “My father, along with many residents of the New Jersey town we are from, died on 9/11.  My mother died recently, without seeing justice.  It is possible that we will not see justice in my lifetime.”

    —Family member of victim, September 15, 2018 

    “Khalid Sheikh Mohammed? You mean he is still alive and that trial hasn’t even started?” 

    —A colleague of mine, who is a retired senior U.S. government official, September 17, 2018 

     

    Earlier this month, as an independent observer for Human Rights First, I attended a pre-trial hearing in the Guantanamo military commission for the 9/11 suspects. The proceedings fell on the week of September 10, and it was particularly poignant to be there on the anniversary of the attacks. Seventeen years later, there is no start date for the trial of the five men accused of orchestrating the attacks, and the long-serving judge has just been replaced. 

    The week’s highlights included a “voir dire” of the new judge, in which he was questioned by the prosecution and defense, and a hearing on the dismissal of the former Military Commissions Convening Authority, Harvey Rishikof. 

    Judge Pohl, an Army colonel, announced his retirement in August and assigned Keith Parrella, a military judge with two years’ judicial experience, to replace him. Just before stepping down, Judge Pohl ordered the exclusion of statements the defendants made to FBI interrogators after their transfer from CIA secret prisons, also called “black sites,” to Guantanamo. 

    Lawyers for the defendants questioned incoming Judge Parrella on his limited experience as a military judge and in death penalty cases. They also raised the potential for conflict of interest, given Parella’s prior work at the Department of Justice (DOJ) as a fellow alongside several members of the 9/11 prosecution team. 

    They also inquired about his knowledge of “mitigation”—evidence from the defense geared to persuade the court that the defendants should not receive a death sentence. The defendants spent years in the CIA’s Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program. Their brutal treatment will undoubtedly be raised as a mitigating factor during any sentencing phase. Defense attorneys also questioned Parella’s ability to come up to speed on past rulings. He would have to review more than 20,000 pages of transcripts of the last six years of pre-trial proceedings. 

    On September 10th, all five defendants were present at the start of the day, along with their defense counsel. The new judge agreed to, among other things, allow the defendants to be unshackled (unless there was probable cause) and keep breaks in the day that coincide with the defendants’ prayer times.

    On Tuesday, September 11th, all five defendants were absent in the morning. Judge Parrella set forth his findings that he possessed the requisite skills and experience to preside in the case, that his DOJ fellowship did not pose a conflict, and that he has no personal bias against the defendants or prior affiliation with the case. 

    Another key matter was the firing of Convening Authority Harvey Rishikof. The government argued that Rishikof was fired due to concerns about judgment, temperament, and a lack of appropriate coordination with superiors. The court heard testimony from Lieutenant Doug Newman, an investigator assigned to the office that oversees the defense teams, who described his investigation into Rishikof’s firing. Newman discussed his interviews with former Obama Administration officials, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and former White House Counsel Neil Eggleston. According to Newman, Eggleston indicated that President Obama had become frustrated with the slow pace and cost of the process and asked for a path to move the case forward. 

    Defense counsel said that Rishikof had been exploring plea deals that would have taken the death penalty off the table and expedited proceedings. They questioned whether his firing constituted unlawful command influence from political appointees who sought to shape the judicial workings of the case and thus, compromise the independence of the proceedings. 

    Upholding both the rule of law and national security are the twin challenges facing the government in this case. The use of torture, as well as alleged government surveillance and intrusion into attorney-client conversations, may result in delays for years to come, with justice remaining elusive for the victims, their families, and the American public. 

    Sushma Raman is the Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and served as an independent observer representing Human Rights First. This blog does not reflect the official opinion or position of Harvard Kennedy School or the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. 

     

    Partners in Crime: An Empirical Evaluation of the CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program
    Averell Schmidt and Kathryn Sikkink. 11/23/2018. “Partners in Crime: An Empirical Evaluation of the CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program.” Perspectives on Politics, 16, 4, Pp. 1014-1033. See full text.Abstract
    Article on : Partners in Crime: An Empirical Evaluation of the CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program

    In the years following the attacks of 9/11, the CIA adopted a program involving the capture, extraordinary rendition, secret detention, and harsh interrogation of suspected terrorists in the war on terror. As the details of this program have become public, a heated debate has ensued, focusing narrowly on whether or not this program “worked” by disrupting terror plots and saving American lives. By embracing such a narrow view of the program’s efficacy, this debate has failed to take into account the broader consequences of the CIA program. We move beyond current debates by evaluating the impact of the CIA program on the human rights practices of other states. We show that collaboration in the CIA program is associated with a worsening in the human rights practices of authoritarian countries. This finding illustrates how states learn from and influence one another through covert security cooperation and the importance of democratic institutions in mitigating the adverse consequences of the CIA program. This finding also underscores why a broad perspective is critical when assessing the consequences of counterterrorism policies.

    Here’s What Erick Erickson Gets Wrong About Dictators and Migration
    Kathryn Sikkink. 12/4/2018. “Here’s What Erick Erickson Gets Wrong About Dictators and Migration.” The Washington Post. See full text.Abstract
    In a recent op-ed, conservative writer Erik Erickson argued that the U.S. government should support the “next Pinochets” to create more stability in Latin America and stop the flow of refugees seeking access to the United States.

    The remark was instantly controversial because Augusto Pinochet was a Chilean dictator who committed massive human rights abuses.

    Read the full article here.

    Introducing the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts (NVAVC) dataset
    Erica Chenoweth. 1/21/2019. “Introducing the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts (NVAVC) dataset.” Journal of Peace Research. See full text.Abstract
    Introducing the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts (NVAVC) dataset article by Erica Chenoweth 

    Scholarship on civil war is overwhelmingly preoccupied with armed activity. Data collection efforts on actors in civil wars tend to reflect this emphasis, with most studies focusing on the identities, attributes, and violent behavior of armed actors. Yet various actors also use nonviolent methods to shape the intensity and variation of violence as well as the duration of peace in the aftermath. Existing datasets on mobilization by non-state actors – such as the Armed Conflict Events and Location (ACLED), Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS), and Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) – tend to include data on manifest contentious acts, such as protests, strikes, and demonstrations, and exclude activities like organizing, planning, training, negotiations, communications, and capacity-building that may be critical to the actors’ ultimate success. To provide a more comprehensive and reliable view of the landscape of possible nonviolent behaviors involved in civil wars, we present the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts (NVAVC) dataset, which identifies 3,662 nonviolent actions during civil wars in Africa between 1990 and 2012, across 124 conflict-years in 17 countries. In this article, we describe the data collection process, discuss the information contained therein, and offer descriptive statistics and discuss spatial patterns. The framework we develop provides a powerful tool for future researchers to use to categorize various types of nonviolent action, and the data we collect provide important evidence that such efforts are worthwhile.

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