Thinking About the World: Philosophy and Sociology

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Thinking About the World: Philosophy and Sociology

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ABSTRACT

In recent decades the world has grown together in ways in which it had never before. This integration is linked to a greatly expanded public and collective awareness of global integration and interdependence. Academics across the social sciences and humanities have reacted to the expanded realities and perceptions, trying to make sense of the world within the confines of their disciplines. In sociology, since the 1970s, notions of the world as a society have become more and more prominent. John Meyer, among others, has put forward, theoretically and empirically, a general world-society approach. In philosophy, much more recently, Mathias Risse has proposed the grounds-of-justice approach. Although one is social-scientific and the other philosophical, Meyer’s world society approach and Risse’s grounds-of-justice approach have much in common. This essay brings these two approaches into one conversation.

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades the world has grown together in ways in which it had never before. This integration is linked to a greatly expanded public and collective awareness of global integration and interdependence. Academics across the social sciences and humanities have reacted to the expanded realities and perceptions, trying to make sense of the world within the confines of their disciplines.\(^1\)

In sociology, since the 1970s, notions of the world as a society have become more and more prominent. John Meyer, among others, has put forward, theoretically and empirically, a general world-society approach. One defining feature of world society is the rise of a general world cultural frame that provides models, norms, and roles on a

\(^1\) A much-shortened version of this piece will appear in Subramanian Rangan (ed.), *Capitalism Beyond Mutuality? Essays Integrating Social Science and Philosophy*, Oxford University Press. The collaboration between the authors was enabled through the Society for Progress, a group of distinguished academics and business leaders devoted to reflection on the future of capitalism; see [http://www.societyforprogress.org/index.html](http://www.societyforprogress.org/index.html). We are grateful to Subi Rangan for bringing that group together at various conferences in London, Fontainebleau and Princeton and thereby also making our joint work possible.
global scale. People, organizations and nation-states are seen to act on normative and cognitive models that are global in character and aspiration. It is less and less plausible to see world society in terms of explanations focusing only on power, interests or economic structures. World society theory is concerned with (often competing) scripts whose institutionalization creates a world culture where general cognitive principles, norms, values, and roles are broadly shared across countries and organizational contexts.

In philosophy, much more recently, Mathias Risse has proposed the grounds-of-justice approach. Grounds are properties of individuals that make it the case that certain demands of justice apply among a group of people. The grounds he distinguishes are shared membership in states, common humanity, shared subjection to the trading system, membership in the global order and humanity’s collective ownership of the earth. A theory of global justice emerges from reflection on the various grounds.

The origins of this collaboration lie in our realization that, even though one is a social-scientific approach and the other a philosophical one, Meyer’s world society approach and Risse’s grounds-of-justice approach have much in common. This essay brings these two approaches into one conversation. Part I, written by Mathias Risse, traces philosophical reflection on the world across history. Part II, written by John W. Meyer, does the same for social-scientific reflection on the world. Part III contains Mathias Risse’s comments on John W Meyer, and Part IV contains John W. Meyer’s comments on Mathias Risse. Part V concludes.

THINKING ABOUT THE WORLD: PHILOSOPHY (MATHIAS RISSE)

1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE WORLD

Political philosophy ponders how best to arrange political and economic institutions and social practices. Philosophers account for ideas such as justice, democracy, and rights, bringing their analyses to bear on existing institutions and practices. Inevitably, most questions about living arrangements arise among people who interact regularly. Accordingly, most political philosophy has addressed local or regional matters. But philosophers have also long thought about the world, about how humans ought to live together on this planet.
This was because reflecting on the scourges of war revealed that lasting peace required suitable arrangements with one’s neighbors, then also with their neighbors, and so on. Occasionally, it was because some story or another was desirable to legitimize intrusion in faraway lands. Often, however, it was because reflection showed that, as much as they sounded like “bar, bar,” people across the river or the imaginary line shared much with one’s kin. They belonged to the same order, in some sense. Or it was because religious or philosophical views rendered it incredible that the benignity or rationality behind the Creation could accord with human divisiveness. There have always been universalistic ideas, emerging from within local worlds of practice. Universalistic ideas and worlds of practice change, and often collide.

Rarely have humans simply stayed put. Thus they needed ways of thinking about how to treat those whom they encountered. Sometimes though not always a next step was taken to think about the world. The goal here is to look at a few ways in which philosophers have thought about the world, roughly in chronological order. There are others more, and outside the Western canon, coverage is spotty.

2. FROM POLIS TO KOSMOS

The Ancient Greeks lived in poleis, city-states with hinterlands, averaging about the size of Liechtenstein. In the fourth century BC, Isocrates famously argued for Greek unity, insisting only an umbrella government capable of keeping all cities in line would cure incessant warfare. This thought of creating overarching structures for peace-keeping has echoed through the ages.

Soon Philip of Macedon overran the poleis. His son vanquished much of the known world. Alexander has sometimes been hailed as a noble dreamer seeking to unify humanity. Either way, it was Alexander’s empire that rendered world unity a phantasy one could entertain. Later the Romans founded an empire that lasted for much longer, and whose memory long after its demise fed the dream of unity.

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2 For a good overview of Greek political thought, see Ryan (2012), chapter 1-5.

3 On Alexander as a dreamer of world unity, see Badian (1958). See also Baldry (1965), chapter 4.
Before all that came to pass Greek political philosophy focused on the polis, and little else. In works such as the Republic (Politeia), Plato’s Socrates theorized city-states. He thought that to live a good life meant to flourish in a city. Parallels between person and city mattered for Plato; parallels between city and world did not. Aristotle’s political philosophy too had little to say on what lay beyond the city-state. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he reported that “some say there is one justice, as fire burns here and in Persia” (Book V,7), and concurred (with qualifications). But nothing was said about how such justice might jointly apply to Greece and Persia.

The first European philosopher to articulate a cosmopolitan view was the Cynic Diogenes. He called himself “a citizen of the world [KOSMOPOLITÊS]” (Diogenes Laertius VI 63) Apparently Diogenes merely meant to convey a negative message: it did not matter for how he saw himself that he hailed from Sinope. Unsurprisingly political thought that began with the polis would talk about the world by first ascertaining ways in which the world (kosmos) was a city (polis).

The Stoics provided a positive doctrine. Much as poleis are governed by law, so is the kosmos. Plato drew parallels between soul and city. The Stoics drew them between city and world. However, the law governing cities is conventional, whereas law governing the world is natural: right reason (logos) by itself can discover it. Access to right reason sets humans apart from the rest of nature. Eventually, each person capable of partaking in right reason would come to be appreciated in his (later also her) own right. The human rights movement still draws on these ideas.

The Stoics had a vision of logos ruling the world but little interest in geography, the places where people lived, and in understanding human diversity. For such work, we must look to the followers of Aristotle, the Peripatetics, particularly Eratosthenes. “While Chrysippus,” an early Stoic, “elaborated the Stoic doctrine of man in the universe, Eratosthenes was mapping and measuring the earth” (Baldry (1965), p 168). It is here that we received a distinctive sense of a civilized world that was nonetheless multi-linguistic and multi-racial.

In the first century BC, Cicero took for granted that the world was (and is) a city. Some earlier Stoics had been understood as restricting membership in the kosmos to the wise. However, Cicero counted everybody a member. But cosmopolitanism became thin at Cicero’s hands.

4 On the Cynics, see Moles (2000) and relevant sections in Parry (2014) and Kleingeld and Brown (2013).

5 On the Stoics, see Baltzly (2003), Brown (2009), and Schofield (1991). See also Konstan (2009).
While *On Duties (De Officiis)* has strong words for the importance of humanity, this recognition sounds hollow in light of the long list of special relations whose moral significance Cicero stresses in his theory of justice.  

### 3. ALL UNDER HEAVEN

In Chinese political thought, the subject all along was the empire, indeed the whole known world. When in the 11th century BC the Zhou replaced the Zhang, the justification for the overthrow spelled out the “mandate from heaven” that specified who got to rule. The implied contrast between “heaven” and “earth” made it natural to regard those over whom rule was exercised as “all under heaven” (*tianxia*). Confucius (around 500 BC), and later Mencius, advocated unity before the background of centuries of warfare. But they appealed to a unity that had existed prior. Confucius’s contemporary, Sun Tzu, admonished in his classic *Art of War* Sun that “your aim must be to take all-under-heaven intact.” (3:11). All peoples should and could join the unified realm Sun Tzu hoped would emerge, even distant barbarians.

But while Chinese thought focused on something much bigger than the city, it also championed something much smaller: family. All under heaven fall into concentric circles with the extended family at its core. Confucius and Mencius did not think of the world as governed by *logos*. Their core notion was “ren,” “meeting of people,” which captures appropriate benevolence, humaneness.

Since the 1990s, the doctrine of *tianxia* has seen a revival. In his 2005 book *The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World*, the philosopher Zhao Tingyang aims to merge the idea of all-under-heaven with the Greek rational dialogue on the agora. What underlies the UN, he says, are ideals of transnational democracy and rational communication, in continuation of the agora. However, the UN is an agora without a *polis*, which would have to be a global *polis*. Zhao believes the Chinese idea of all-under-heaven provides what is missing, harmonizing Greek and Chinese thought.

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6 On the connection between the Stoics and Cicero, see Baldry (1965), chapter 6.

7 For the themes in this section, see Angle (2012) and Bai (2012).
4. THE CHRISTIAN MIDDLE AGES

*Kosmopolis* and natural law morphed into Christian thought. The world became a *kosmos* created by the maximal God. What especially fell on fertile soil was the Stoic tale of two cities. Both *polis* and *kosmopolis* made demands. Christians recast this tale: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's” (Matthew 22:21).

In Augustine’s appropriation, the polis became the worldly political domain. Worldly power was a playing field for deluded, violent characters. Even if they tried, they could not determine if they had achieved justice. Justice means to give each his due. But if only the Christian maximal God knows what that is, the just world as a human creation is categorically out of reach. The *kosmopolis* Augustine transforms into a spiritual sphere where people of all origins are eligible to become “fellow-citizens with the saints” (EPHESIANS 2:20). But this city of God is open to believers only. For Christianity, thinking about the world means to think about this whole world, but also always about the transcendent world that really matters.

Christianity kept alive a spiritualized vision of Roman rule as a driving ideal of empire. Central to the cosmopolitan thought of Antiquity was world *citizenship* rather than a *government*. But it was the thought of the world ruled by one government that became central in Dante’s *De Monarchia* around 1300. To achieve the kind of perfection humanity is capable of, the whole species must pursue this task. The diversity of striving must be protected by a universal structure. Putting a monarch in charge best suited the endeavor.

Dante’s *humana civilitas* was not thought to inhabit all of the earth. Since the archaic Greeks, Western thought marked off a finite stretch of earth from the formless expanse surrounding it. The *orbis terrarium* (the realm where people lived) included Europe, Africa, and Asia, with the impassable ocean all around. “The world”, understood as the space filled by the *humana civilitas*, was not the whole planet.⁸

5. EUROPEAN EXPANSIONISM

For the first time, European seafaring explorations raised questions about the division of the globe as such. There were sophisticated trade economies that included large parts of the

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⁸ On Dante and the Christian Middle Ages, see Heater (1996), chapter 2. On Dante and medieval cosmology, see Bartelson (2009), chapter 3. On the boundaries of the world, see Romm (1992).
known world before this period. But the world only now became the planet. For better or worse, “Columbus brought the two halves of the planet together.” Globalization has always been about exporting models of order. In the early stages, it was heavily driven by a papal directive to proselytize.

Questions arose about how the conquering nations should divide their spoils. Many ancient ideas about the world now resurfaced. Some argued that Native Americans were natural slaves (revitalizing an Aristotelean doctrine) and could not own property. Much later, with the advancement of science, this approach hardened into “scientific” racism. Others, notably Vitoria, insisted that natives had to be respected as humans who owned territory. But he too justified conquest.

Considerations about proper land use became increasingly important. One guiding idea was the Stoic law-of-nature doctrine to let strangers use things one does not need. A case could be made that if “savages” resisted the occupation of land, in the eyes of these beholders they could not meaningfully use, violence was appropriate. Then there was the view that humanity collectively owned the earth. This thought too goes back to the Stoa. More importantly, it is in the Old Testament.

God’s gift of the earth to humanity became the pivotal thought of 17th century political philosophy. All major figures, from Grotius at the beginning via Hobbes, Selden, Pufendorf, and Filmer to Locke at the end of the century, had views on what such ownership amounted to. The disagreements were about who precisely was the recipient (only Adam, or humanity collectively), how it could be bequeathed, and what natural rights to stuff collective ownership implied (as opposed to entitlements from transactions).

The great political development of the 17th century was the cementation of an order consisting of sovereign states, states that are peers and free to conduct domestic and foreign policy as they see fit. Wars made states, states made wars, but states also made nations and nation-
states. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia came to symbolize the initial stages of this process, but the slogan of the 1555 Augsburg Religious Peace captures the era best: *cuius regio eius religio*, he who controls a region gets to choose its religion (and much more). To this day, and into the foreseeable future, ours is a world of states. It was through centuries-long decolonization that the European system of order ultimately triumphed.

Several of the natural lawyers of the 17th century were social-contract theorists. Grotius, Pufendorf, and others applied that model globally and laid the foundation for international law. However, what nowadays we recognize as international law largely emerged only in the 19th century. Initially, international law was designed to regulate interaction among colonial powers. Gradually more and more countries were created. The result was a world of artificially equal states operating in what increasingly became a global system. Later, the 20th century was characterized by the establishment of organizations devoted to international problem-solving, foremost the UN.

In a world that increasingly limits the policy space of nation-states, questions arise about whether the global order is still best described as a state system, and what feasible alternatives could be. Let me just mention two approaches. In the middle of the last century, Carl Schmitt argued that the world of states had expired in the 19th century when colonialism reached its limits. He saw the future in a world of great spaces, *Grossräume*, but rejected global oversight insisting that whoever said humanity sought to deceive. Arguably, the current posturing of China expresses agreement with this kind of approach. A very different approach was recently adopted by David Held, whose work explores the shift from nation-states to a world of “overlapping communities of fate”, and how democratic standards and cosmopolitan values can be entrenched globally. Held supports the subordination of regional and national sovereignties to an overarching legal framework.

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12 The formulation that states made wars and wars made states goes back to Tilly (1975).

13 See Beaulac (2004) for the extent to which the importance of Westphalia has been overstated.

14 For the history of international law, see Nussbaum (1954) and Koskeniemmi (2002).

15 Schmitt develops his thoughts on international order most extensively in his 1950 *Nomos of the Earth*. The quote about humanity Schmitt attributes to Proudhon, but agrees with it; see (1963), p 55.

During the Enlightenment initial steps were taken to ensure the political and legal map would also include individuals. Natural law since Antiquity had talked about individuals. But for much of history recognizing individuals as having any kind of status across borders could not have amounted to much. In the 18th century, the American Declaration of Independence spoke of “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” This wording was symptomatic of an emerging transnational public. The 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was intended to make sure power was exercised also on behalf of individuals who often needed protection from states more than from anything else.

Organizations started to emerge to pursue concerns of individuals across state lines that would often not align with interests of states. In the 19th century, the paradigmatic movement was that of the working class. But the mother of transnational humanitarian efforts was the British anti-slavery movement, dating from the late 18th century. Throughout the 19th century, transnational social activists adopted additional causes. Eventually, these ways of protecting individuals fed into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and much subsequent international law. Individuals as such came to matter in the 20th century as they never had before.\(^\text{17}\)

One philosophical work from the end of the 18th century conceptualized the world in a novel, multi-faceted way. Kant’s *On Perpetual Peace* was guided by the idea that “the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to a point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”\(^\text{18}\) Kant’s was a world of states -- not just any states, according to his prescriptions, but states that would allow for some degree of representation of the people. He also believed right cannot prevail among persons in their own state if other states threaten their freedom. A federation to keep the peace was needed. Kant’s world also gave status to individuals by acknowledging a cosmopolitan right of hospitality to protect individuals in dealings with foreign governments. That humanity jointly inhabits a planet also entered: it is because we share a sphere rather than

\(^{17}\) On the history of the human rights movement, especially the predecessors, see Lauren (2003).

\(^{18}\) See Kant (1991), pp 107-8.
an infinite plane that we have inevitably encountered each other and must regulate our affairs in ways respectful of all members of the moral community.

7. INTO THE 20TH CENTURY

The desire to build trade routes instigated exploration throughout history. Trade allowed for exchanges of products, technology, best practices, and ideas. Artisans would copy foreign merchandise, ship’s doctors studied local herbs, and vessels added useful features spotted in foreign harbors. Animals and crops would be transplanted and tried elsewhere. But long-distance trade would normally be trade in luxury goods affordable only to a few. Only the Industrial Revolution allowed for mass-production of goods, as well as for fast transportation.

In the 19th century, globalization incited fierce reactions. Marx and Engels regarded capitalism as inherently expansive, breaking the bounds of the state system. Bourgeois ideology legitimatized “free” trade while impoverishing millions. They also held that across countries the proletariat had common interests. The Communist Manifesto ends with the rallying cry “Working men of all countries, unite!” Communists juxtaposed the thought that trade makes the world with the thought that trade worsens oppression, but thereby also hastens the revolution.

Politics became global in the first half of the 20th century like never before. Communism, liberalism and fascism were vying for supremacy. Fascism emphasizes authoritarian rule and subjection of individuals under collective control. Hitler’s Mein Kampf talks about human rights only to mock the idea by emphasizing that persons have one such right: to belong to a racially pure group. But both liberalism and communism offer moral visions that make the individual central. Both also have found ways of losing sight of that commitment. For the remainder of the 20th century, much of the world was divided between liberal-capitalist and communist countries.

8. RECENT THOUGHT

A stage-setting work in Anglo-American philosophy during the last third of the 20th century was Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Rawls submitted that the way to think about justice was by creating a

19 For how trade has shaped the world, see Bernstein (2008), Pomeranz and Topik (2006), and Findley and O’Rourke (2007).
“reflective equilibrium” between intuitions regarding justice and the principles that systematize them. In the process, intuitions and principles would have to be adjusted to fit each other. Central to this effort was an “original position”, modeling individuals as engaged in a choice about principles of justice under constraints (especially a “veil of ignorance” shielding them from information about their station in life). The result of this process was Rawls’s two principles of justice, which give primacy to everybody equally enjoying civil and political liberties, provide fair equality of opportunity in accessing goods and status, and arrange remaining socio-economic inequalities to everybody’s advantage.

The intensity and breadth of the work animated by Rawls mark these last decades as one of the most intense periods in the history of political philosophy. This should be little surprise: better understanding of the functioning’s of society and of technology provides more policy tools than ever before; populations have grown enormously in the last 200 years, and many are well-educated and wish to participate actively in society; and both domestic societies and the world as such have become intensely intertwined, politically and economically.

Rawls’s early work mostly concerned one state at a time. By the time he developed his thoughts on international affairs, in Law of Peoples in the late 1990s, the field had changed. “Global justice”, thus the world, had become increasingly central. Even in Law of Peoples, however, Rawls saw the world through the lenses of the foreign policy of the kind of state he favored. By then others had applied his approach globally. Rawls argued that it is the existence of a basic structure of political and economic institutions – those determining the fundamental parameters of interaction– that renders penetrating principles of justice applicable among those who share them. But as in the first instance, Beitz and Pogge insisted, such a basic structure exists globally. Rawls himself, and others, denied this, asserting the moral significance of what people have in common who share a state. 20

Pogge later argued that the basic global structure is arranged enduringly to inflict grievous injustices on the most vulnerable. 21 The dependency theory made a similar case, maintaining the “periphery” of the global economy would continue to decline given that its major contribution (resources) would increasingly lose in relative value. Suspicion easily falls on a world that works out much better for some than for so many others. Nowadays most (not all) philosophers take a kind of moral cosmopolitanism for granted, recognizing some sort of

20 See Beitz (1979) and Pogge (1989).

human equality. Disagreement looms in assessing what such equality entails given that the world is a complex web of relationships (as Cicero knew). The views on the relationship between polis and kosmopolis that were open to Stoics are now open to us.

9. WHERE THINGS STAND

The multifarious ways in which people have thought about the world are still with us. Our common humanity matters. Nothing serves better to illustrate this than the human rights movement, with its focus on the idea that something about us being human generates entitlements and corresponding obligations held by distant people. We no longer consider the earth a divine gift. But intellectuals, enlightened politicians, and foresighted citizens understand that (in a geological era sometimes called the Anthropocene) we must see ourselves as having a relationship with our planet across generations. “Nature” is no longer independently given, but something we ourselves can shape, though not in all ways, and not always the way we want.

Political and economic interconnectedness is mirrored in organizations and intergovernmental arrangements and the elaborate body of international law that regulate transnational interactions. The diversity of ethnicities, to which Eratosthenes alerted readers, has too often fallen prey to rank-ordering, with calamitous and even cataclysmic consequences. “Racial equality” became a buzz-word only at the beginning of the 20th century, to no avail then for at least several more decades. For many religious people, the power of theology that compels them to think about the world as such rather than parts of it also forces them to see this world as merely an ephemeral one in a much larger scheme of things. This prevents them from seeking reasonable terms with others on an increasingly crowded planet.

States have withered but they have not withered away, as Engels predicted. Still, much that matters is no longer decided within states. International often trumps domestic rule-setting. International culture fuels domestic culture. The rising worship of the individual reflects the decline in worship of states, as well as the rising worship of the “world.” However, the period during which individuality and equality have been praised has also been one of massive economic inequality. We are currently on the brink of a technological revolution. One result could be that we increasingly modify ourselves, perhaps creating untold numbers of blond, super-intelligent children who excel at sports. Another result could be an exacerbation of inequality. Those who know how to make or use technology will prosper. Others may become increasingly economically useless.

The thought that humans matter as such has also led to the thought that whatever makes us matter might also apply to other creatures. Some talk about “expanding circles” of moral
concern, insisting our treatment of animals is abysmal. Soon, our world may include machines equipped with artificial intelligence, which might pose a grave threat to humanity. Perhaps eventually we must see the earth as part of a living space consisting of a large chunk of galactic space, and confront aliens that may make demands on the resources of our planet.

Environmental ethics has become prominent, reminding us that there are plants, ecosystems and other components of nature deserving of moral concern. While we can attach values to nature only on a human scale, we can value nature other than instrumentally. We must recall the long-term consequences of the Stoic idea of natural law: by empowering individuals, it also has a way of setting us apart. The insistence on the importance of human rights is not incompatible with a concern for the planet. But nor are these viewpoints automatically linked.

The social world has become almost incomprehensibly complex. It is populated by states and individuals, and of course companies, many transnational, and some of those huge conglomerations. The last century has witnessed an extraordinary growth of civil society. The relative importance of all these entities for bringing about change is debated, as is their importance for the kind of question that exercises philosophers, such as how to think about justice at the global level.

These matters are urgent since they might help us navigate uncharted terrain to meet the challenge of our time: how to keep our flourishing species from ruining the very world of which we are part. If we fail, the planet will still be there. But the other senses in which we have come to think about the world may end up lacking a reference. Perhaps only a few humans will eventually remain to remember that there was once more to “the world.”

\[22\] See Singer (2011).
THINKING ABOUT THE WORLD: SOCIOLOGY (JOHN W. MEYER)

1. INTRODUCTION

The social sciences as distinct disciplines generally arose after the Enlightenment, evolving out of the broader arena of philosophy. They developed over the 19th century, expanded in the first half of the 20th century, and then grew explosively in the period since World War II. Their growth parallels rather precisely the notorious decline in the humanities (Frank and Gabler 2006; Drori and Moon 2006). Before the 19th century, topics now considered social scientific were discussed by philosophers and theologians, not by specialized sociologists or economists (though there is some tendency to anachronistically discover sociology or economics in Aristotle or Ibn Khaldun). The social sciences have tended to focus on, and take for granted as central, the core ontological elements of the post-Enlightenment social world: the nation-state and the individual. Even now, the social sciences are relatively stronger in the West – especially the Protestant West with its individualism (Frank, Meyer and Miyahara 1995). But the nation-state system has spread to the whole world, and the social sciences have spread along with it. For example, the end of the Cold War created an explosion of social science in the former Communist countries.

The tie of the social sciences to the nation-state system has meant that their comprehension of a supra-national or global society has been delayed, often falling behind more popular awareness. The critics of “methodological nationalism” have a strong case (e.g., Beck 2000). Even in obvious situations, such as the rise of European institutions, social scientific discussions are halting: rich literature on social life and welfare in Sweden or Spain are not paralleled by a similar literature on “European society.” Overall, the social sciences are late-comers to universalistic notions of a supra-national society: their orientations are to a world of national societies built on originally-Western models.

The Enlightenment, it has been said, “discovered society.” Before then, universalistic thought in Christendom tended to locate an ideal social order in something above a mundane physical and social reality seen as chaotic or corrupted. Various mixtures of faith, reason, and natural law could make sense as general principles. Similar mixtures can be found in earlier and other civilizations, but the social sciences as we see them arose principally from Western Christendom.
After the Enlightenment, conceptions of society as a coherent system of interdependent parts and locus of purposive action arose. Society was seen in the plural, and the world was understood to be filled with them. Increasingly, with Social Darwinism (as in Spencer 1896) they were seen to lie on an evolutionary or developmental scale. By the late 19th century all the major sociologists had a typology of societies along these lines (e.g., Durkheim [mechanical-organic], Toennies [gemeinschaft-gesellschaft], Marx [feudal-capitalist], Weber, or Comte). Primitive or pre-modern societies were seen as natural systems, embedded in nature and culture. Developed ones were rationalized and differentiated, and the consequence of purposive action: variously by individuals in liberal versions, and by the state in illiberal ones (Toulmin 1990).

Society was depicted as an autonomous functional system, disembedded from history and culture: this, it was understood, was the source of the great success of the West. Society is thus seen as an organization, produced and maintained by the interaction among its purposive differentiated parts (often individuals, or organizations culminating in the state): “Man makes himself” is the idea. History may enter in through the purposes built into the various parts making up the social system, but not as a collective property. Culture seen as a collective meaning fabric, characteristic of pre-modern and primitive societies, was mainly left to the anthropologists. Religion was clearly thought on its way out, and certainly, any Church with a real cosmology was. If religion survived, it was as part of a belief system of individuals and groups within society, not of society itself. All these underlying images remain alive in social scientific understanding: they also make up a relatively dominant world ideology (Thornton, Dorius and Swindle 2015 provide many examples from research around the world).

Increasingly, notions of society became linked to the nation-state (though sometimes a “civilization,” when imperial or religious ambitions were strong, as with the European colonial powers). The older transcendental ideas of a common universal moral order, secularized, developed into social scientific laws applicable everywhere – but found in their highest form in dominant countries. So by the 20th century, the special Western religious status of the human person was in part reformulated as carried by national citizenship and thought to be necessary and functional for complex societies. Rationalization and differentiation create distinctive roles and combinations of roles for individual persons, producing the advanced modern conscious individuated person – and the need for such well-schooled persons in the complex society (Simmel 1976[1903] is the locus classicus of this line of thought). Thus, religious salvation was increasingly translated into compulsory education, and thought to be functional for economic, political, and social institutions (e.g., Parsons and Platt 1973; the parallel with earlier notions of salvation is made by Shils 1971).
The lines of thought noted above depicted single societies. In practice, however, all these separate societies jostled up against each other in various forms of interdependence—exchanges of people, goods, and ideas; conflicts; occasionally perceived collective problems. This produced specialized discussions of structures and rule systems in particular areas: interstate relations, trade, scientific matters, and such problems as piracy. These issues were addressed as matters for the inter-state system to resolve. The nation-state had sovereignty, however fictitious (Krasner 1999) – defined in and certified by a wider political-religious system (attributed to Westphalia). So weak notions of a supra-national order arose rather frequently, but nothing like a complete world society. This was the main social science situation until the end of the Second World War (though ideas of a wider kind arose both before and after World War I). We can review some of the dimensions of the imagined partial world orders of the social sciences before World War II:

**Political interdependencies within the system**: Nation-states needed to deal with each other, and a special field of international and diplomatic relations defined governing norms and their rationales: this world was an inter-state system, often thought to devolve from Westphalia. Lines of analysis arose in the emergent political science subfield of international relations, especially in the first half of the 20th century. This society of states had rules, sometimes seen (in realist international relations theory deriving from Hobbes and Machiavelli) as created by rational state actors acting in a global anarchy (e.g., Waltz 1979, Gilpin 2001). But sometimes this inter-state system was seen more broadly as an inter-state society (following Grotius), reflecting older universalistic religious cultures. Lines of thought emphasizing this broader notion were developed by Hedley Bull (1977) and the English School (Buzan 2014).

**Imperial linkages beyond the system**: Western expansion created political relationships with the wider world. Asymmetries of power turned most of these relations, in several waves of expansion, into imperial ones, culminating in the famous “Scramble for Africa” in the later 19th century. Justifications and analyses centered on evolutionary ideas: metropoles were extending civilization to their colonies, speeding their development: religious themes were prominent, with Protestant missionaries carrying nation-state models of moral and social development, and Catholics (especially Jesuits) carrying somewhat distinct ones (Casanova 2016, Woodberry 2012). Often, notions of racial inequality supported claims to fairly permanent imperial domination, but increasingly ideas that all societies could eventually develop into autonomous national states took hold. In practice, over the whole post-Enlightenment period, colonies did shift into the canonical nation-state status at increasing rates (Strang 1991): after World War II, the rate increased even more, and the nation-state became completely dominant as a form.
The important point here is that conceptions of an integrated global society were not central to the development: our world is one in which something over 200 entities claim sovereign status, the great majority with extended international recognition, as with the 193 United Nations members. The social sciences have tended to take this self-description of the inter-state system for granted, rather than seeing it as a culture.

**World economic regulation**: Beyond political and military relations, new international rules arose (and old ones expanded) through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, attempting to manage economic transactions. Intellectual developments were intensified by the Great Depression, clearly seen as a creature of a world economy. The new rules and regulations, importantly, tended to define economic interaction mainly as a network of relations, not much of a society, and certainly not of a corporate body analogous to a nation-state: the contrast with the highly organized system (e.g., the WTO and the World Bank) that arose after World War II is striking. Of course, the whole structure could be seen and analyzed (e.g., by Marx or Lenin) as rooted in economic imperialism.

**Individuals and civil or human rights**: Similar patterns arose in domains we now call human rights: the Western system early on came down on the theoretical point that savages had souls and thus polities (i.e., societies), and must be treated with the forms of respect. Such forms were maintained even under the ugliest conditions of actual exploitation, as with the many American treaties with the Native Americans, and the many religious efforts to recognize indigenous societies in Latin America (Casanova 2016). The main vision was of relationships among different societies, not the creation of an integrated society. But in good part deriving from the religious and cultural constitution of the nation-state system, notions of the rights of individual humans expanded through the whole period (Lauren 2011, Stacy 2009). As such notions of the standing of human persons came to the fore, suppressing or even exterminating masses of these persons also developed: citizen-persons are more threatening than peasants and tribesmen.

**The knowledge system**: Also on a supra-societal level, a shared international knowledge system continued from the pattern of the old medieval universities, which recognized each other’s degrees and sciences. The emerging nation-states created more and more such universities. Notions were often articulated that the knowledge system was global, and lay above the authority of particular nation-states. Indeed, the cultural frame of the whole nation-state system lay in a medieval model of a transcendental authority behind both individual and sovereign. The ambiguity of nation-state legitimacy is forcefully illustrated by the dependence of these entities on a more universal knowledge system: as nation-states arose they created universities linking themselves to this culture (Riddle 1990).
All of these arrangements – political, economic, social, and scientific or educational -- expanded around the world, far beyond any roots in Christendom. They were analyzed and validated by the emerging social sciences, which facilitated and legitimized the expansion as rational. The expansion was in part through a global process of colonization. But the impulse to copy standard institutions continued at very high rates up to the present. Universities, for instance, are now found everywhere. So are the formal institutions of citizenship, with education, welfare, and human rights policies (and sometimes practices). Through most of the post-Enlightenment period, they make up an international system, not a world society – a collective conceived to have life and spirit of its own. Ideas of that sort, through most post-Enlightenment history, retain their status as dreams more than realities. But one can find many examples. For instance, around the turn of the 20th century, there were notions that the human race should collectively manage its reproduction: population control ideas changed into eugenics ones by the inter-war period (and then into a global population control movement after the second War) (Barrett and Frank 1999). Similarly, there were global movements in opposition to war, to promote the health of children, create common weights and measures, or to improve education. And there were movements for something like global conservation, initially rooted in sentimental visions, and only gradually developing into more ecosystemic conceptions of the environment (Frank 1999).

Mainly though, the social sciences intensely focused on the separate societies and their functioning, not the world as a whole. They could be compared, as distinct entities, but did not make up a single entity. Their relations with each other were analyzed as ties between independent entities – diffusion of particular traits, influence and domination, exchange, or conflict. Some of these relations might produce integration and incorporation into a single larger entity, even an empire, but not a world society. Sometimes the relations were seen as producing economic or ethnic or ideological differentiations – divisions of labor, as it were – but these were only rarely seen as making up a sort of supra-societal social system. Ideas along this line arose in anthropology (Heath 1954, Barth 1969), but had little influence on the other social sciences. Thus the strong picture of society constructed in the rising social sciences made it difficult to see systemic social structures at a supra-societal level.

3. SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTIONS OF WORLD SOCIETY AFTER WORLD WAR II

The first half of the 20th century saw forms of supra-national interdependence that began to undercut the picture of the social world as made up of independent “societies.” Political, military, economic, moral and social crises and disasters followed on each other for a full half-century. All of them were understood to follow from the system of unregulated nationalist states, and all of them clearly called for the creation of a global society that was more than the
sum of national political and economic interests. The Great Depression was understood as an international failure. The League of Nations had failed, and a disastrous first war was followed by an even more disastrous second one. Genocidal forces, built on nationalist and racist claims, had been unleashed. Waves of social movements, clearly supra national, carried Fascist or Communist ideas and models around the world. A nuclear age made global interdependence obvious.

But social scientific conceptions in the early post-War period still saw the world as made up of independent national societies, with limited relations to each other: the new idea was that some of these relations could bring widespread progress. So education, or national planning, or economic investments, or freed-up trade opportunities, or efficient states might be keys to national development everywhere. Strategies for improvement through religious change – the stock in trade of an older regime – were sharply de-emphasized in preference for more scientific methods (but see Hagen 1963, or McClelland 1961). The overall picture of the world was one of a classic bar chart: each nation had its own bar, and some were much taller than others. With the right social scientific strategies, all the bars could get bigger. As one indicator, national plans were in vogue, and a great many countries formulated them (Hwang 2006).

With increasing interdependence, and with the many failures of the post-War faith in “development,” expanded conceptions of the world as a more global order arose. It became painfully clear that the recipes of social scientific development theories did not produce much country-by-country progress in the Third World. Expanded education, rationalized state structures, and heavy economic investment did not add up to the promised rapid growth. International economic equality showed little if any increase. There seemed to be no magic bullets for economic growth, and by some measures, the Communist world was doing better.

Further, after World War II a whole set of explicitly supra-national, and often global, conceptions developed, with a “world economy” or economic “world system,” an “international political system,” a recognition of international “human rights,” and dramatically a world “ecosystem.” In similar ways, a self-conscious global artistic and literary system arose, with its celebrations of a common world cultural heritage. In every case, leading intellectual movements – usually with strong scientific and social scientific support – played central roles. The resulting structures took organizational forms, often linked to the emergent United Nations system, reflecting the dominance of the liberal societies left standing after the war. But quite beyond these, all sorts of supra-national organizations were formed, often in and around Europe (Boli and Thomas 1999).

All these arrangements exploded, intensified by the Cold War competition. And, more slowly than one might expect, explicit social scientific attention followed, intensified in the later neo-
liberal period. So in recent decades, in every social science field or sub-field, one can now find specialists on supra-national dimensions: such people would have been scarce before the war. In sociology, a number of leading figures began to use terms such as “world society,” “world polity,” “world system,” or “global culture.”


These lines of thought, though given respectful attention, were given more deference than influence. Influence tended to lie with the realists and functionalists in international relations, and their continued conceptions of the world as an inter-state system (see the attempt to escape this in Katzenstein (1996). Often, since social science has its own special conservatism, even the new and more global scholars continued to see the bigger world simply as a network of distinct national societies. So there was a great expansion of research comparing countries around the world (Marsh 1967). Most of the comparative research simply gave increased attention to the international relations and interdependencies of societies still seen as distinct. But there has been a slow sea change, and assumptions about the directly global character of social change that would have been exotic a few decades ago now creep into the staidest research ventures.

4. Research Foci on a World Society Since the 1970s

Since the 1970s, there have been increasing tendencies to see the social world as more than a network of autonomous actors and to imagine world society as something of a new reality. Social scientists are heavily involved, both in creating and in studying these tendencies. Core grounding structures of this new reality lie in several areas:

--- Human rights: Much research focuses on the rise of empowered conceptions of individual persons as having common human rights (and capacities) around the world, to be supported by supra-national forces (Elliott 2007). An older system in which rights were linked to national citizenship and the putative obligations of the nation-state is normatively superseded by a global system. More and more kinds of people are defined as having rights (women, children, the handicapped, the elderly, indigenous people, various minorities), and sociologists study all of them. More and more rights are defined beyond the classical civil, political, and social rights: culture and religion are to be defined by the individual, not the state. Further, there is an expansion of theoretical empowerment: people and organizations are thought able and
responsible to further their own rights and those of other people elsewhere in the world. Overall, in important ways, the sovereignty of the individual has tended to replace that of the national state, whose charisma (though not organizational power) declines.

--- Nature and the ecosystem: The extraordinary expansion of science (and social science) means that scientized conceptions of nature take on much more authority in the world (Drori et al. 2003). These are linked to visions of a common global ecosystem, with common obligations around the world (Frank 1999). The world, formerly seen as one place mainly in an abstract sense, comes to be seen in this way in very concrete ways: air and water and earth are now seen as limited on a global scale, creating a mass of actual and perceived interdependencies.

--- Social organization: Filling in a void created by increasing interdependence in a world without its own regulatory state, there has been an enormous expansion in rules of reason and rationality. Conceptions have expanded of properly transparent and fair transactions and relations among the commonly-entitled human individuals in an imagined orderly nature. Matters formerly considered cultural could increasingly be analyzed on a unidimensional scale of corruption or irrationality, and many such scales have been created. Social scientists are heavily involved. Much of the work goes on in a rapidly expanding global network of business schools prescribing standardized social structures everywhere in the world (Moon and Wotipka 2006). In the same way, standardized prescriptions for nation-states and state agencies are copied everywhere (Simmons et al., 2008, Meyer et al. 1997).

These underlying transformations in the basic ontological cartography of humans in nature and society produced more globalized models on many different dimensions of social life. For example, global integration brought to the fore many earlier ideas that economic life was global rather than national: developments in one country affected progress elsewhere – perhaps negatively. Many discussions, thus, focused on ideas of a world economy: statistical measures of the state of this economy became more common. Radical conceptions – dependency theories, and “world systems” theories, often employing Marxian reasoning – saw this economy as a very unequal and unequalizing one (Wallerstein 1974 was the key sociological proponent, linked to the Latin American dependency theorists). Capitalist systems of production and exchange produced and maintained the inequalities that are so striking in the world, suppressing the power of labor by shifting it to weak global peripheries. Another argument gave more attention to the dramatically unequal exchanges characterizing the world economy: core countries monopolized the production of high-value goods, exchanging them for over-produced goods of the peripheries. All the new ideas stress that there is one big economy – a pie – and the winners, no longer autonomous and successful bars on a bar chart, are excessive wedges in the pie. Rather than being successful, they are pigs. Less radical visions stressed the need for protective and redistributive mechanisms to produce more equality around the world:
ideas of this sort are central to policies of institutions like the World Bank. In other words, even traditionally liberal forces, institutionalized in core powers and dominant global organizations, came to see the world as more than a liberal economy. It was a society, and a very unequal one, so conceptions of global injustice have intensified over the current period. One illustrative symbol has been the high prices of medical drugs—available at the core, but out of reach for most people in the peripheries: given a world in which health is increasingly seen as one of the basic human rights, the perception of injustice has been tangible (Inoue and Drori 2006).

Beyond economic foci, sociologists came to see more and more dimensions of social life around the world as interdependent. Researchers increasingly focused on global diffusion, sometimes seeing it as exploitive, but in any case giving a distinct and global account of what was formerly seen as local and national institutions like the state (Simmons et al. 2008). So contemporary sociologists attend to educational expansion around the world – the rapid growth of both mass and tertiary schooling – as a global process (Ramirez and Boli 1987). Further, it became clear that despite all the inequalities and cultural differences around the world, conceptions and institutions of schooling show remarkable global homogeneity (Meyer et al. 1992, Frank and Gabler 2006): Schooling systems (and universities) can now, for better or worse, be ranked on unidimensional scales.

Other sociologists see global influences behind the rapid worldwide changes in the norms of family life: the spread of formerly-Western laws and practices in such areas as gender relations is commonly analyzed as a global rather than local process (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996, Frank et al. 2010, Thornton et al. 2015). Even analyses of religious and cultural developments around the world now tend to stress global processes producing common forms (Beyer 1994, Robertson 1992 and elsewhere).

Similarly, sociological analyses of organizational forms around the world tend to stress the diffusion of common elements. These follow the prescriptions of the social sciences taught in the expanding business and professional schools (Bromley and Meyer 2015). Recognizably similar formal organizations appear in every country, and in every social sector: private firms become formalized organizations; as (under the doctrines of the New Public Management) do government agencies. And a host of forms formerly distinct – churches, schools, universities, hospitals, charities, and recreational associations – become “non-profit” formal organizations. Religious congregations have strategic plans, CEOs, information systems, and formalized structures to deal with every “stakeholder.”

Of course, all these processes are analyzed as generating global integration, but this in no way indicates the rise of a more peaceful world. As societies coalesce on many dimensions into more global forms, many conflicts are intensified. Simple differences come to be seen as
conflictual or inconsistent. Gender and age-group relations provide examples: if men and women and children have common rights and powers, then variations among formerly-distinct societies come to be grounds for conflict: customs of female circumcision become violations of women’s rights, disciplinary arrangements become child abuse, gender choice becomes immorality... Global movements for women’s and children’s rights become very aggressive, supported by social scientific thought and analysis: they generate much resistance too (Boyle 2002). Religious issues come to the fore: conflicts arise over headscarves, the consumption of tabooed foods, the protection of animals, and so on: religious architecture offends zoning rules, as with minarets.

The whole development we discuss here – the rise of conceptions of a global society – is very much in the making. Most sociologists, and other social scientists, prefer more conservative visions. They emphasize distinctive local patterns in economic, political, social, and cultural life, and prefer to de-emphasize the diffusive and global processes that become increasingly apparent. For instance, even with rather tame changes, such as the rise of the European Union, it took social scientists a long time to come to terms and focus their research on the new reality. Globalization faces the same social scientific conservatism, and scholars have strong vested interests in emphasizing the distinctiveness of their (often national) cases. Change is slow, but over the decades quite dramatic.

WORLD SOCIETY AND PLURALIST INTERNATIONALISM: MATHIAS RISSE
COMMENTS ON JOHN W. MEYER

1. INTRODUCTION

My work has aimed to make the global central. Central to my theory is an account of different grounds of justice. Grounds are the properties of individuals that make it the case that certain demands of justice apply among a group of people. The grounds I distinguish are shared membership in states, common humanity, shared subjection to the trading system, membership in the global order and humanity’s collective ownership of the earth. Each is associated with principles of justice. A theory of global justice emerges from reflection on the various grounds. I call my theory, “pluralist internationalism,” to capture the enduring importance of states from a standpoint of justice while recognizing various other grounds. The
grounds-of-justice approach incorporates several ways of thinking about the world we encountered in the overview.

What has struck some as misguided is that my theory combines many issues under “distributive justice.” But an expansive deployment of considerations of distributive justice follows from making the global central. Justice captures the most stringent moral demands. Such demands arise in multifarious ways, including several that are global in nature. In all such cases, there is a distributive dimension of sorts. I see individuals as members of states, members of the global order, co-owners of the earth, participants in trade and human beings. In all roles, they are subject to demands of distributive justice. We no longer have the luxury to think about justice in terms of city-states, states or empires, without making explicit the manifold ways in which “we are the world.”

2. MATCHING ONTOLOGIES, AND WHY IT MATTERS

One thing that is striking from John Meyer’s account is how the origins of the social sciences help explain hostility or aloofness in some circles toward reflection on global justice. State-centered views naturally display that attitude. The explanations international relations realists tend to field turn on the kind of power states muster to pursue interests. Interstate conflict is essential. States are largely taken as given. IR liberals make more room for values and focus on interstate cooperation. But they see cooperation as driven by values states project upon the world. The global mostly enters by way of interstate affairs.

These approaches look askance at global justice inquiry because of ontological differences. Their explanations fail to make notions of the global central. But if normative and descriptive theory diverges in terms of how they see the world (in terms of ontology), the ideal theory does not match with what is driving things. Such a mismatch nourishes the suspicion that either the empirical or the normative side got things wrong (a suspicion that would be the larger the harder one thinks the descriptive theory makes it see how the normative ideal could ever come about).

In contradistinction to state-focused approaches, Wallerstein’s world-systems theory and like-minded views stress the historical significance of economic interconnectedness, that is, of the transnational division of labor that divides regions into core, semi-periphery, and periphery, depending on their contribution to the system. Culture registers only as an ideology of dominant constituents. This approach concurs with inquiries into global justice by way of seeing the world as an interconnected system, where explanations cannot be largely reduced to
activities of states. But it too matches uneasily with accounts of global justice to the extent that those theorize anything other than economic structures.

Social science matches uneasily with philosophical global justice inquiry if categories of the global or normative ideas (or both) are not granted explanatory power. As opposed to all these approaches, world polity (or society) analysis, developed by John Meyer and others, does match well with global justice inquiries because it grants explanatory power to both. This approach views the world as one social system with a unified cultural framework (world polity/society), that nonetheless is implemented in a myriad of conflicting variations. A polity or society is a system within which values and norms are defined and implemented through collective mechanisms that confer authority. A world polity is such a system with global dimensions. In a pluralist spirit, this approach theorizes various kinds of actors (whose interplay confers authority), including states, companies, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. All play causal roles in explanations and influence each other.

The defining feature of world polity – and it is in this fashion that world polity analysis offers a unifying approach to global affairs -- is that it provides norms and roles that jostle up against each other. World polity theory helps itself to normative ideas because it finds that people act on them, instead of proposing explanations exclusively in terms of power, interests or economic structures. The theory is concerned with scripts whose acceptance, and the competition among which, create a world culture where certain norms, values, and roles are broadly shared across countries and organizational contexts. Praiseworthiness in norms, values, and roles helps explain why some, but not others, get accepted. Ideas about legitimacy, justice, and rights enter prominently.

World polity analysis adopts a rich ontology. The connection to pluralist internationalism’s similarly encompassing ontology is obvious. If both theories can be supported on their own terms, they would not stand awkwardly next to each other, as would realism and pluralist internationalism. My work talks about a global order, the system of states and the network of international organizations that aspires at international and even global problem solving. Given the existence of that order, its importance for human flourishing and for conceptualizing global responsibilities I have proposed a conception of human rights as membership rights in the global order. Meyer talks about world society. For my purposes, I now think this is the better term. The global order is embedded into world society. But talk about a global order under-describes the extent to which ours is also, for instance, a world of human persons. Instead of membership rights in the global order, human rights are better described as membership rights in world society. It is the world society that philosophers need to come to terms with.
I now identify three areas where I think world polity analysis supports views I have submitted. I mean to illustrate how world society analysis matches well with global justice inquiry, but would also like to emphasize how it lends support specifically to views I have argued for. To begin with, the explanatory centrality of the adoption of successful scripts in world polity analysis indirectly supports my moderate justification of states. Secondly, world polity analysis allows for the extension to the global stage of a justificatory strategy in Rawls' *Political Liberalism* that I have adapted to that stage in another way. Thirdly, world polity analysis offers an account of change that sits well with my approach. In concluding I draw attention to another aspect of world policy analysis that is generally useful to philosophical analysis.

Note first that the explanation of change through the adoption of successful scripts connects to some of the themes in the philosophical survey. World polity analysis sees that polity largely as a product of Western intellectual tendencies, especially Christian notions of personhood and legitimacy. It was through the Church that Roman notions of law-governed community transpired to medieval Europe. Christianity cherished a spiritualized understanding of Empire that Christian rulers appropriated. Connecting to Stoic ideas of *kosmos* and equality, Christianity saw each human as created in the image of God. This model of order that provided both for a certain kind of rule and an ideal of personhood within a governed space (citizenship) then spread around the world. A world culture has emerged that triggers the formation of en-actable cultures and organizations that in turn elaborate world society further.

While the violence that colonialism projected plays a role in the emergence of this culture, world polity analysis also sees other factors at work in the spread of dominant scripts. To a large extent, that spread can be explained through voluntary adoption of successful models (e.g., states and citizenship). As an illustration, consider Michelangelo’s “Creation of Adam” in the Sistine Chapel. It displays the moment when the spark of life is transmitted from a dignified, white, bearded male God to a young, naked, white Adam. Adam is (almost) literally created in the divine image. That depiction of creation must offend many visitors, from women to non-Europeans. But all of them have adopted a way of thinking about themselves as individuals they saw as successful in white men. The sacredness of “man” generates boundaries (religious, gendered, racial, class, etc.), imposed by the fact that some humans were seen as sacred and others not, or in ways others were not. That generated efforts on the side of the disadvantaged to be seen in the same ways as the advantaged. What once was alien became genuinely appropriated.
One implication is that the global system does not lose overall legitimacy because its origins are tarnished beyond repair. Part 4 of *On Global Justice* offers a moderate justification of states, pointing out their moral and prudential advantages and that we cannot theorize competing models of order sufficiently well for them to be action-guiding. But this view gains in plausibility if we do not have independent reason to think of world society as inherently unjust or otherwise morally deeply flawed. I rebut various ways in which one might think either is the case. Room needs to be made for potentially extensive reparations for past injustice. But it is reassuring that we can explain the emergence of world society in ways that emphasize processes of enacting successful scripts.

This might seem like an odd, even offensive point. Readers may have wondered all along why the survey of ways of conceptualizing the global failed to mention Gilgamesh, the Bhagavad Gita, Popol Vuh, any Buddhist approach, the Dao or anything from Africa. The answer is that we live in an intellectual universe where ideas of European origin play an outsized role. Does it add insult to injury to say that these ideas have spread by becoming accepted among those who were conquered? No. If that is what happened, it would be a peculiar form of orientalism to characterize the outcome in terms of insult added to injury. It has been difficult to form counter-western approaches that provide an account of global order.

European conquerors themselves took scripts from earlier actors. Models of empire and citizenship were alien to Germanic invaders of Rome. But the alien can indeed become appropriated. Danish writers can lay claim to Cicero’s legacy as much as Italian intellectuals can. But then Greek intellectuals have no more claims to counting Aristotle among their predecessors than professors at a university in Delhi or Nigerian academics. All of them are what Husserl called “Funktionäre der Menschheit,” civil servants of humanity, where how we think about humanity and other aspects of the global are the result of a centuries-long process that created a world culture, to the detriment of competing scripts that expired or got relegated.

4. WORLD POLITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RAWLS’ *POLITICAL LIBERALISM*

World polity analysis also connects to a justificatory strategy in Rawls’ *Political Liberalism* I have already developed for another context. *Political Liberalism* offers an account of justice designed to be applicable only in constitutional democracies. Rawls justifies his view by referencing ideas implicit in the culture of constitutional democracy. This includes conceptualizing humans as free and equal citizens.
Moral theories, we can say drawing on Bernard Williams, must adopt a view of persons that is either factual or normative. A liberal theory may empirically see persons as autonomous choosers. But religious fundamentalists see them differently, say, as creatures of divine grace whose fates are ill-understood as resulting from autonomous choice. It seems practically impossible to settle this dispute. A theory may also treat individuals as persons with certain capacities for purposes of the theory, but defend that view without appeal to facts. Then we


This grounding is the starting point from which to argue for the theory at hand. Rawls’ view of personhood is supposed to be plausible only to those accustomed to democratic practices, citizens who see each other as free and equal ((1993), p 19f). Proceeding this way has the advantage of formulating principles that do speak to persons involved in relevant practices. As he explains,

THE CONCEPTION OF THE PERSON IS WORKED UP FROM THE WAY CITIZENS ARE REGARDED IN THE PUBLIC POLITICAL CULTURE OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, IN ITS BASIC POLITICAL TEXTS (CONSTITUTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS), AND IN THE HISTORICAL TRADITION OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THOSE TEXTS. FOR THESE INTERPRETATIONS WE LOOK NOT ONLY TO COURTS, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND STATESMEN, BUT ALSO TO WRITERS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND TO THE MORE ENDURING WRITINGS OF ALL KINDS THAT BEAR ON A SOCIETY’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. ((1993), P 19F)
Individuals are not *empirically* free and equal. Instead, there are practices accompanied by moral ideas about citizenship. It is within those ideas – which refer to persons in idealizing ways – which individuals are *seen as* persons with certain powers. But there is also a connection between these ideas and the practices individuals engage in so that, again, it makes sense to say that being persons with such powers idealize roles individuals actually occupy in democracies. From there one, can assess Rawls’ arguments for why relations among free and equal citizens should be regulated by his two principles.

*On Global Justice* applies this approach to humanity’s collective ownership of the earth. Just as it is implicit in constitutional democracies that individuals are considered free and equal citizens, it is implicit in the global order that they are seen as co-owners. The idea that individuals are co-owners is an idealization: empirically it might be false that they are respected as co-owners in any plausible way. But it is an idealization that not only emerges from our practices but that we ought to care about by virtue of the considerations supporting collective ownership of the earth. Just as principles of domestic justice make states acceptable to citizens, so human rights make the global order acceptable to co-owners.

Now that the ontological connections between world society analysis and grounds-of-justice approach are visible another parallel is available for world society as a whole. The point is to identify idealizations of personhood implicit the practices of world society. The research done within world society analysis offers ample evidence (drawing also on ideas of religious origin and ideas about the importance of science in world culture that is curiously missing in the Rawls statement above about idealization in domestic society). From there one could argue that membership rights in world society should be acceptable to persons parallel to how principles of domestic justice should be acceptable to citizens and principles regulating resources and spaces of the earth to co-owners of the earth.

Rawls’ use of his justificatory approach neglects the global character of his idealizations. One may only be the citizen of one or perhaps several countries. But citizenship is a global idea. World society analysis helps us see that we cannot only develop a justificatory strategy at the global level parallel to what Rawls does domestically but that his own strategy *calls for* such a development.
5. THINKING ABOUT POLITICAL CHANGE

*On Global Justice* says little about change. I take the global order as given to explore what principle of justice hold. Possibly other grounds become actual in the future, much like membership in world society has in the last 200 years or so. At this stage, we cannot theorize about a global order that would not essentially include the kind of power centers constitutive of states. So, for the time being, we should make world society as just as possible -- the kind of change my theory proposes-- rather than aim to create a different order.

In *Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency*, Lea Ypi proposes a more ambitious understanding of change. Ypi is interested in activist political theory, a theory that seeks to change the world. Activist theory gradually shifts the public culture to advance progressive projects. Its main audience is the political avant-garde, politically conscious and engaged people who suffer from the injustices of an era and have taken it upon themselves to bring about change. Without the spearheads of political change, there would be no activist theory to affect reality. Without activist theory, we could not identify the avant-garde. Ypi proposes a general theory about the exchange between political theory and practice in history, thus also a theory of the role of intellectuals in political change. Currently, she submits, avant-garde activism seeks to create a cosmopolitan world with appropriate institutions.

Ypi’s theory is admirably ambitious, but much more evidence must be procured for this to be a convincing account of change. IR constructivists (such as Kathryn Sikkink, Thomas Risse, and Margaret Keck) with whose work she makes contact pursue much less ambitious projects. After all, theirs is the burden of substantiating empirical theories with evidence even realists and liberals could accept. What is more, I doubt a general theory of change of the sort Ypi has in mind can be developed.

World polity analysis conceptualizes change as a messy multifaceted process: different scripts are in circulation and one or the other will eventually get adopted at a larger scale before there is renewed contestation. Different scripts might prevail in different regions, or be present in the same society and generate conflict. World culture in a diverse, decentralized and conflict-ridden world brings challenges to the fore the more intensely the various actors rub up against each other. Our world is filled with activism, rule-setting, “othering,” and so on. Before this background, the way Ypi sees the avant-garde is reminiscent of how Marxists have seen the party. A diffuse understanding of change strikes me as more plausible than Ypi’s model, which overemphasizes interaction between two kinds of actors without exploring how these actors blend into a background culture.
A notion that becomes central in world society analysis is “de-coupling.” This notion is useful for philosophical analysis generally. De-coupling occurs if practices deviate from avowedly adopted scripts. Given the pressure towards isomorphism, de-coupling is common, especially where scripts were adopted recently or conflicted with other scripts. For instance, de-colonization generated an abundance of de-coupling since new states were structured in ways unrelated to needs and conditions.

“De-coupling” is a valuable notion for reflecting on how political philosophy bears on reality. Realists dismiss philosophical ideas as pipedreams (unless backed by canon and factories). Marxists see them as part of the Überbau that merely reveals predilections of ruling circles. World polity analysis makes room for ideas even where they are not, or not yet, uniformly implemented. Agents might struggle to adjust to roles but fail. They might not be supported by their environment, not know how to proceed, or lack means to do so. But none of this shows that ideas cannot drive change. De-coupling a natural aspect of change driven by ideas. We do not generally believe we live in an Augustinian world where only God knows what justice is and human capacities for realizing ideals are severely curtained by original sin. We commonly believe ideals can be realized. We live in a world where plenty of ideals jostle up against each other and compete for enactment.

Philosophical reflection on the global is a reservoir of examples of de-coupling. Cicero’s insistence on moral equality stood in stark contrast to the slave-holding and belligerent practices of Rome Cicero supported as an official. Colonization in the name of natural law harbors enormous potential for de-coupling. Vattel pointed out that natural-law justification of conquest was a game too many can play. The same is true for imperialist attitudes characterized by the formulation, “the white man’s burden.” Liberalism and communism are political ideals driven by individualistic moral visions. But once institutionalized, both were interpreted in ways that have little relevance to those who did poorly in the system.

In Nomos of the Earth, Carl Schmitt explores the idea of humanity ((1950), pp 71ff). Conquest in the Americas led to the question of how to treat indigenous people. One stance was the Aristotelean view that “Barbaric people” were natural slaves, invoked by Sepúlveda. Stressing that Sepúlveda was a humanist, Schmitt thinks the idea of humanity generates a dialectic he seeks to capture in terms of his master notion of the political as driven by friend/enemy distinctions. That humanity matters leads to the idea that it comes in degrees. One group can depict themselves as higher types. Christianity poses limits to such a thought (each person created in God’s image). But within a movement that makes humanity central reflection on
types of humanity in due course delivers the idea of the lowest type, Unmensch (inhuman). Once the Unmensch is seen as non-human, the dialectic delivers the distinction between Übermensch and Untermensch (super-, sub-human).

For Schmitt, this highlights the normative uselessness of the notion of humanity. But this is too limited an analysis. On the one hand, the differentiation among types of humanity shows that the idea of humanity spread and triggered responses from those whose practical and theoretical interests were at stake. On the other hand, such a spread of ideas will generate much de-coupling because not all relevant actors will be able to fit the new ideas smoothly into their motivational framework. So what Schmitt draws our attention to may not be practical failures, but symptoms of successful adoption of a script, and thus of expansions and globalization of ideas. The phenomena Schmitt observes also generated much corrective mobilization (e.g., the predecessors to the human rights movement).

To mention a recent discussion, Raymond Geuss (2005) accuses Rawlsians of proposing principles of justice that in practice support enormous inequalities. Rawls allows for socio-economic inequality to the extent needed to aid the worst-off. But whether they do is a matter of counter-factual speculation: in a society with less inequality, would the worst-off really be worse off than the currently worst-off? The difficulties in answering this question, Geuss submits, help generate a policy landscape that greatly advances inequality. Since policy-makers can argue that such measures, to their knowledge, work to everybody’s advantage, we can expect to find much decoupling. A substantial share of economic improvement in the last decades has accrued to the wealthiest. Whether this is attributable to Rawlsian philosophy is, of course, a different matter.

A great danger that can be captured in terms of de-coupling is the following. Two things happen currently that make for an alarming combination. The first is that climate change requires urgent action, but vested elites have little interest in engaging. The situation is much like in the many episodes of collapse Diamond (2005) recounts. At the same time, joining the elite is increasingly a matter of accomplishment. Wage-income matters, coming from the ability to make technological change work for oneself. Talented people increasingly marry each other, found stable families and provide an inordinate amount of high-quality parenting. Much research shows that schooled professionals normally support change. But the great danger is that such people, by joining the elite, adopt enlightened views de-coupled from their membership in the elite that refuses to take our main challenge seriously.

De-coupling can sometimes also convey some optimism (and thus does not have to be an overall bad thing). There has been debate about how to think about the success of the human
rights movement 70 years after the UDHR. Some argue that not enough change occurs, that human rights talk is window-dressing. But one may also say there is a lot of de-coupling going on as part of a long-winded process of making norms stick. Argumentative self-entrapment might occur gradually. But human rights are part of a world culture that worships individuality. So there is a reason to be optimistic that human rights will catch on more. But then again, also recall the point made in the preceding paragraph.

REFLECTIONS ON GLOBALIZATION IN PHILOSOPHY: JOHN W. MEYER COMMENTS ON MATHIAS RISSE

1. INTRODUCTION

Ideas about justice and related social rights and obligations depend heavily on conceptions of the fundamental entities in which the rights inhere. They also depend on conceptions of the frame within which they are seen, which may be a social world or a natural one. It is clear that globalization, in social perceptions and in actualities, is radically changing both conceptions of the human entities seen as basic to society and the frames defining their relations to each other. Mathias Risse considers the meaning of justice in economic, political, and cultural frames that are now globalized, in light of correspondingly globalized understandings of the nature and properties of the humans involved. Of course, universalized theoretical ideas about the standing of human individuals, and thus about justice in their relations with each other, have long histories in philosophical and religious thought. But they have functioned along with much practical experience in inequality and differentiation, and in societal frames that are intensely local in character. With globalization, there is much expansion, but also an expanded awareness of inconsistencies between the practices of inequality and the theories of equality.

Implied in this account, and central in my interpretation is that it is obvious that the mix of fundamental entities in the social world has changed very dramatically with globalized frames in recent decades: and it follows that grounds of justice change too. It was one thing when one group’s shaving customs differed from those of unrelated people on the other side of the earth: it is another when the shaving customs are known to give those people skin cancer. It was one thing when societies were understood to differ in their (autonomous) development: it is
another when globalized understandings see one society’s development as undercutting another’s (Chase-Dunn 1989).

I reflect here on the ontologies underlying the plural structures of the contemporary social world, and how these have rapidly changed in recent decades. I am concerned with three basic changes:

--- First, there is the enlarged and globalized picture of the human individual, and the expansion of the properties of this individual relevant to considerations of justice (Frank and Meyer 2002, Meyer and Jepperson 2000). With individuals entitled and empowered on more dimensions and seen as equal on a global basis, many more differences and inequalities can be seen and organized as injustices.

--- Second, there is the rise of conceptions of a global society, with corresponding economic, political, and cultural models of interdependence – and especially ecosystemic models sharply defining tight interdependence (Frank, et al. 2000). An inequality between A and B becomes more of a perceived injustice if A is seen as helping cause B’s poverty. Further, the emerging global society lacks a strong integrating political organization. Thus the pluralist structures Mathias Risse analyses are not integrated or balanced by any authoritative structure. This makes possible more injustice claims and weakens any clear resolution.

--- Third, there is the relative weakening of the fundamental ontological status of the nation-state and its associated local institutions, within which justice claims were formerly organized, structured, and tamed: and the rise of ontological claims about the world transcending any stabilizing state-like polity (Meyer et al. 1997). Unjust inequalities among persons have long been seen within national states. It is easier, now, to make injustice claims on a global scale.

I briefly reflect on the consequences of these changes for the social construction of justice and injustice. I think the results have involved an enormous expansion and globalization of plausible injustice claims and a consequent worldwide increase in social mobilizations around such claims.

2. GLOBALIZED “MAN” – THE UNIVERSALIZED AND EXPANDED PUBLIC INDIVIDUAL

It is certainly convincing that abstract and universalistic notions about the individual – man – as a general category run very far back in history. Perhaps they have always gotten more emphasis in the West than in other civilizations. They are clearly ideas and ideals, drawn from much reflection, rather than models drawn from practical experience since they are put forward by
people intensely involved in practice with all sorts of social stratification (e.g., slavery) and differentiation (e.g., from one city-state to the next). In Greece and Rome, as in Palo Alto now, abstract ideas about justice among ultimately-equal individuals prosper along with multidimensional inequality and differentiation. The sociological term for this sort of situation is “de-coupling,” and it is very fashionable (see the review by Bromley and Powell 2012) since contemporary society is filled with greatly expanded normative and policy ideas at great variance with rapidly expanding and differentiating practice. Relevant to the immediate issues here, globally expanded ideas about universal human rights coexist with a world society with really extraordinary levels of inequality on every dimension. The inconsistencies involved fuel much social mobilization.

Reading Mathias Risse’s account makes it clear that the tension between universalistic ideals and practical realities is of very long standing. Among other things, it leads to classificatory boundaries, distinguishing between entitled “man” and other categories of human existence: barbarians and primitives, foreigners, women, children, subordinated social classes, ethnic groups, and races; disabled people, and so on. In Western Christendom, entry in the world of individual justice was sometimes restricted to “saved” Christian people. In close parallel, in the last century and more, the entire natural human race, as produced by families and communities, has been deemed inadequate for the elevated category “man:” and almost universal programs of compulsory education arise that remove people from family and community and socialize them in an institution under the control of the national state. With the Education for All movement, this compulsion is now defined as a global human right (Chabbott 3003): universalized education is also a dominant practice. So it becomes more difficult to legitimize inequalities on social, racial, ethnic, religious, historical or even national status.

The social sciences in general, and sociology specifically are very much creatures of Western Christendom, and in particular of an Enlightenment that evolved out of and reacted to an earlier religious formulation. The sciences are usually about individuals with citizenship and personhood functioning in social communities with nation-hood and states. Seen against the long philosophic traditions, the social sciences look modern and quite scientific, but also somewhat parochial, focused on individuals in modern nation-state societies. With the focus on individual citizenship as the main identity, many common forms of traditional social practices are ruled out or marginalized. The main dimension is a scale: who “man” is. Ultimate units of social life are often culturally defined not as individuals, but as families, communities, ethnic groups, races, and so on – supra-individual corporate bodies. Modern thinking in both social science and philosophy tends to eliminate these structures as fundamental, reducing them to their individual components. So our rules emphasize the equal standing of each man and women, not men and women as corporate groups (though there are exceptions, as when
certain proportions of positions are reserved for women, or when certain representatives are chosen only by women).

Thus, the social sciences and contemporary philosophers tend to converge on the individual human person as a fundamental bottom-line unit of society. In this, they reflect (and help create) long-term institutional changes in the advanced countries. So the abstract ideas of earlier philosophers about “man” come to be more and more concretized and emphasized in societies. In this, the philosophers join with many forces in the contemporary world that undercut the ultimate authority of familial and ethnic (and now even national) communities in the name of individual rights.

The focus on the individual as the bottom-line primordial unit of society has been powerfully enhanced, and given increased practical reality, by globalization in the whole period since World War II. Human rights ideologies and institutions have exploded on a global scale (Elliott 2007). They define more and more types of people as “men.” They define more and more rights as inhering in “men.” They extend the definition of “man” as reaching entirely beyond the political boundaries of national states and citizenship so that even the term “man” comes to seem narrow and exclusionary. And they directly support justice claims by explicitly empowering “men” of all sorts to take positive action on behalf of their expanded rights (Elliott 2007).

Overall, thus, abstract concepts of “man” become concretized around the expanded modern conception of the individual. In the process, they become globalized, so that political, social, economic, and cultural matters are organized as individual rights in a global frame.

2. GLOBALIZING THE POLITY WITHIN WHICH JUSTICE IS DEFINED

Social scientific thinking and apparently philosophical thinking focus on universalized notions of individual “man” as a very real bottom line unit but are also ordinarily rooted in notions of a polity or state as a core collective structure with a similarly primordial status. (The underlying post-Enlightenment structure reflects the earlier Christian sacralization of both the Church as the Body of Christ and the soul of the believer). Correspondingly, there are ambivalent notions of justice: the provision of justice by the state can be different from the just entitlements of the nominally-equal “men.” Liberal and democratic models elide the distinction, imagining markets and elections that merge individual and collective needs by definition. Corporatist and statist models emphasize the distinction, often giving preference for collective needs and distributional principles rather than the desires of the individual (Jepperson 2002 has a more complete typology here).
In practice, societies embedded in the nation-state system since the Enlightenment come to terms with the tension between the grounding principle of the individual “man” as the bottom-line unit and the actual models and realities of great stratification and differentiation in the nation-state. The term “structuration,” from Giddens (1984), is often employed, capturing the idea of boundaries between institutions, and thus between rules of justice (Giddens emphasizes class conflicts and boundaries, but the point is really more general). Mathias Risse uses the term “pluralism,” to emphasize the institutional differentiation involved at the global level, in parallel with common analyses of the modern national society. Thus, some rights and obligations inhere in familial relationships, others in business organization, and still others in nation-state polities. One may be obliged to support another person because he is a brother, keep him at arm’s length in an organizational setting to avoid corruption, and kill him if he is an agent of another state. Differentiated boundary rules are then developed to make clear which institutional structure applies in a given time, place, and social setting.

Liberal societies, with their special stress on the rights and powers of the individual, tend to generate more institutional differentiation (Mathias Risse’s pluralism) than others since they have more distinct structures to bound, and empower more individual action (e.g., through courts). Corporatist or statist societies, giving more ontological status to the collective, may have stronger and simpler systems of differentiation and stratification. Sometimes, the state may define justice by fiat.

All of these systems, through the modern period, have tended to focus on the rules of order and justice within an imagined national society, and one with a state (even if a very liberal one) setting the rules and frame. The rules for relationships cutting across the national boundaries are less stable. Sociologists, for instance, have much research bearing on the inequalities obtaining between Mexican-American children in El Paso and Swedish-American children in Minnesota: this research takes its interest from the assumed normative baseline of equality. There is very little research comparing the Mexican-American children in El Paso with their cousins a mile or two away in Ciudad Juarez: and it is unclear what standard the researchers would take as the baseline (though increasingly doctrines of equality are extended beyond national boundaries).

All this changes rather rapidly with globalization, which shifts attention to issues of justice on a supra-national scale.

The naturalized pluralism of post-Enlightenment modernity evolves over time, and goes global, with changed pictures of the rights of individuals and changed institutional frames differentiating different arenas. Education becomes an individual right on a global scale. Principles defining unfair treatment in the workplace expand: the son of the boss should really
get an MBA before entering the firm. The rights of women in the family expand: marital rape is criminalized as a global matter (see also Frank et al. 2010). Fundamentally, these changes involve shifts in which entities have what ontological status. The rights of the individual expand: the powers of the family decline, and so on. And some new entities come into place: rules of incorporation, for example, permit an explosion in organizational structures with their internal boundaries and principles of justice. The rules defining legitimate entities evolve over time, often with some conflict, and enforcement by states. But they are normalized and taken for granted in much social life.

All of these expansive changes are going on at a global level, not simply national ones. The organizational expansion, educational expansion, or expanded rights of women and children in the family, occur in all sorts of countries as well as in the explicit rules and ideologies of an expanding international discursive and organizational system (Meyer et al. 1997).

Mathias Risse’s account, emphasizes the rise of multiple dimensions of interdependence, and hence multiple forms of justice, on a global scale. What makes it especially relevant is that it permits (a) a clear discussion of the dramatic and rapid changes in the recognized ontologies with (b) an internationalization that creates recognized interdependencies far transcending any state-like structure. That is, the force of Mathias Risse account is both in its stress on pluralism and also on a very dynamic pluralism that transcends the state.

I can here simply summarize some dramatic changes in the ontological shape of recognized social life in recent decades and call attention to obvious consequences for forms of justice claims that arise and sometimes drift toward institutionalization. The changes are clearly highly interdependent.

First, there is multidimensional internationalization of recognized social life: many more and stronger interdependencies – political, economic, military, social. The social world is a much expanded place. Each new or expanded interdependency creates grounds for claims. The most dramatic instances of this involve the cultural construction and recognition of global ecosystemic interdependencies. Extinctions limit biodiversity for everyone. Global warming creates massive consequences. Expanded global imagination generates potential threats of attacks by asteroids.

Second, as discussed above, the status of the human individual is greatly expanded and globalized. People have more recognized rights and powers, and these are explicitly extended to humans of more sorts (i.e., old, young, gay, sick, poor, and so on) and supra-national social locations. With a massive human rights regime, all this is done in the name of the ontological primacy of the equal individual. Thus, there are many more dimensions on which injustice
claims can be defined. Mathias Risse’s pluralism becomes more plural – across categories of people, across social functions.

All this globalization or internationalization occurs in a system with weak regulatory powers. Claims expand, but without much of an arena for decision and adjudication. Mathias Risse’s pluralism becomes ever more plural, expanded across national boundaries and all sorts of social functions, and across societies. But in the absence of anything like an integrating state structure, balancing or adjudicating the claims arising from various forms of interdependence is not feasible. Under these conditions, Mathias Risse’s pluralism can become inflationary. It is easy to define new areas of interdependence, expanded human rights, and thus new possible conceptions of injustice, without an organized stabilizing polity in global society.

3. THE WEAKENED ONTOLOGICAL PRIMACY OF NATIONAL STATE AND SOCIETY

The rise of actualities and perceptions of a global society and the reorganization of individuals as direct members of global society (with human rather than just citizen rights) weakens the primordial status of the nation-state. Mathias Risse explicitly discusses the lowered status involved.

This means that claims for justice and order can more readily transcend national boundaries, as domestic rules and practices can be seen as violations of more universal rights and responsibilities. But in the same way, it also means that many internal structures of pluralist society – structures that commonly depend on state-based legal frames – are weakened. The claims of the family on the individual weaken against human rights rules. Similarly weakened are all the institutions of communal authority – religious, ethnic, economic, and diffuse political communities. They are all subject to universalized external assessment, and penetrated from within by the greatly expanded rights and powers of the individual, and/or globally defined environmental or economic obligations, and thus squeezed between the internationalized external authorities and the locals claiming to stand in terms of the rules of the external authorities. For instance, formerly quaint local customs of female circumcision can be attacked both by locals (in the name of individual rights) and by world figures. Or local destructions of forests may be attacked as violations of global needs and rules. Or local economic practices may be seen as violations of global rules about trade. In all these cases, global concepts of justice come into conflict with local ones.
4. CONCLUSION: CHANGES IN THE PLURAL JUSTICE FRAMES

I outline here a very few consequences of the expanded and changed ontology discussed above, and the changes in the frameworks of the pluralisms that are activated.

First, the expansion of legitimated individualism creates many possibilities for analyzed injustice (and consequent social mobilization). More people, of more sorts, are included, now covering the whole world. More qualities of these people (e.g., educational, medical, or cultural properties) are organized in expanded and differentiated pluralism and thus are covered by expanding rules of justice or injustice. It is possible, for instance, to see essentially every transaction in the modern global economy as riddled with injustice.

Second, the weakening of the boundaries around the formerly-charismatic national states expands comparative frames, and the capacity of people to mobilize around those frames, to a global scale. It is easy to create organizations pursuing justice on a global scale, and these structures grow exponentially (Boli and Thomas 1999). A specialized activity and industry around fishing, for example, comes under the scrutiny of many supra-national organizations attempting to make and/or to regulate claims arising from the interdependencies involved.

Third, weakening nation-state boundaries, and expanding global institutions, subject the states themselves -- formerly the adjudicators of justice -- to the wider claims of the supra-state system. Local people can take issue with inconsistencies between their standing in the nation-state and their human rights in global society. Increasingly, states must defend themselves in a wider arena. But they also can and do make more and more claims in this arena. In both respects, the states increasingly tend to depict themselves as assemblies of individuals -- the real primordial entity of the globalized order. They claim legitimacy derived from the “people” (who are now globally defined in human rights terms). And they claim to serve these “people.” Only a few try to constitutionally legitimate themselves in terms of other constructions (e.g., religious, historical, ethnic, racial, etc.).

Fourth, the absence of a legitimately controlling center of the global system creates opportunities and incentives supporting the expansions of organization and mobilization noted above. That is, the normative system involved has inflationary qualities, with many opportunities for expansion and few for restrictive control. Any good social scientist now has chances to “discover” and construct a new injustice. Mathias Risse’s pluralism is clearly expandable -- and expanding as we write. Thus many of the factors noted above create opportunities for expanded expertise, professionalization, and scientization. The capacity to articulate and analyze and construct the expanding arenas of a pluralist system is a very great
resource. For example, the educators and psychologists who address as a social injustice the failures of young women to become electrical engineers gain credibility and authority on a worldwide scale.

Fifth, the physical and social global world, in reality, and in perception, becomes a dominant frame within which distinctive claims can be made. Many other issues get organized around this structure in a pluralist system. It tends to be depicted as a closed system, with many zero-sum properties: and can be used as a rhetorical substitute for an organized world polity. This tendency is intensified by analyses of a global ecosystem: something analogous to a “polity,” seen as created by Nature. The imagery of climate change, species destruction, resource limitations, or disease developments and flows on a world scale, play a role in constructing a more reified conception of the world – often the natural world, now given sometimes-sacred standing.

CONCLUSION (JOHN W. MEYER AND MATHIAS RISSE)

As a social scientist, Meyer offers descriptions of, and explanations for, phenomena in the world. As a philosopher, Risse makes normative proposals for what the world should be like. So in that sense, they are engaged in very different activities. But there is also much convergence between them. Some of that is along dimensions that sets them apart from other approaches in their respective disciplines.

One dimension of convergence is that both Meyer and Risse give a central role to cultural phenomena – norms, values, and cognitive models -- in their approaches. To be sure, this is unsurprising as far as Risse is concerned since norms and values are the bread and butter of moral and political philosophers. Nonetheless, this is remarkable because it means Meyer ascribes a causal efficacy to the sort of cultural forms – now often structured at a global level -- that philosophers explore in their normative approaches and whose efficacy is often de-emphasized by other social scientists. If ontologies in different fields of inquiry fall apart, one is left with the suspicion that at least one of them gets its approach to the world wrong. On the other hand, a field of academic inquiry gets some reassurance from the fact that another field of inquiry uses a similar ontology.
What is more, both Meyer and Risse make world society central to their inquiries and do so in ways that pay close attention to the plurality of different kind of entities that populate the world as conceived by their respective lines of inquiry. Meyer emphasized the term “world society” (or “world polity”), and much of this work in recent decades has sought to draw attention to the fact that phenomena we observe across countries are interconnected and are most plausibly explained as genuinely global phenomena. “World society” and “world polity” then become apt terms to describe human interaction at the macro scale. Individuals, states, companies, intergovernmental organizations, organizations of various sorts in global civil society all populate the world society, generating, propagating and accepting ideas and scripts addressing the world as a whole.

Risse offers a theory of different grounds of justice of which several are global by nature. In particular, he conceives of human rights as membership rights in the world society (originally as membership rights in the global order). He also gives pride of place to humanity’s relationship with the planet, as well as to common humanity. States continue to matter in Risse’s approach because he also thinks that membership in states is a ground of justice in its own right. So unlike state-focused philosophers, Risse does indeed make the world central; but unlike other philosophers who do so as well, he thinks that structures that do not include the whole world matter from a standpoint of justice. (In addition to states there is also the international trading regime, which is not aptly described as a unitary global system).

Both Risse and Meyer, in other words, attend to the rapid globalization of recent decades, and to the new cultural models and new ontologies this creates. And both call attention to the pluralistic character of the expansion. In Risse’s case, the focus is on the new, expanded, and multiple grounds of justice created. In Meyer’s case, the focus is on statelessness and lack of integrating structure for the multiple dimensions of globalization, and thus the expanding and multiple kinds of injustice that can be defined and that provide grounds for social mobilization.

Both analyses lead to the conclusion that globalization, integration, and consciousness lead to rapid increases in the kinds of injustices that are perceived and that can be bases of conflictual claims – in a world society without strong mechanisms for stabilizing legitimizing social and ideological controls. The world is a very diverse and very unequal place: rapid integration turns the diversity and inequalities into actual and potential injustice claims – which can readily be defended philosophically -- and does so on an expanding set of pluralistic dimensions. As with many integrating but stateless situations, the present world provides many opportunities for contending lawyers and clerics – and frequently also for intra-national and inter-national episodes of violence.
LITERATURE


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